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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This is an appeal from a final judgment entered after a jury trial by the
Second Judicial Disb:ict Court in and for Davis County, State of Utah. This Court
has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78A-4-103(2)G) of the Utah
Code and Rule 4(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES

Issue I:

Did the district court abuse its discretion by excluding certain

opinions of Appellants' expert witness, Brent Cathey, even though Appellants
failed to make a threshold showing that the excluded opinions were reliable as
required by Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence?
Standard of Review:

"The trial court has wide discretion in

determining the admissibility of expert testimony, and such decisions are
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Under this standard, [an
appellate court] will not reverse a decision to admit or exclude expert testimony
unless the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability." State v. Sheplzerd, 2015 UT
App 208, ,I 11, 357 P.3d 598 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Preservation:

Appellants preserved this issue in their Memorandum

in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Objection to Cathey Testimony, (R. 737), and in

arguments made before the district court, (R. 1162-1209; 1551-1575).
Issue II:

Did the district court abuse its discretion by not issuing a

curative instruction after sustaining Appellants' objection to a statement made
1
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during trial by Mike Miller- one of Appellees' fact witnesses- even though
Appellants' trial counsel did not request that a curative instruction be given and
expressly declined the district court's invitation to issue such an instruction?
Standard of Review:

"The trial court has wide discretion in

determining the admissibility of testimony, and such decisions are reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard. Under this standard, [an appellate court]
will not reverse unless the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability." State v.

Dnvis, 2007 UT App 13, 1 7, 155 P.3d 909 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Preservation:

Appellants did not preserve this issue for appeal. As

explained in the Argument section of this Brief, Appellants waived and forfeited
appellate review of this issue by inviting the alleged error of which they now
complain and by expressly stating that they did not want the district court to
fj

give a curative instruction to the jury. (See R. 1644:21-1656:17).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS

The following provisions are attached as Addendum A:
~

Utah Rule of Evidence 702
Utah Rule of Evidence 103
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 61

2
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a final judgment entered by the Second Judicial
District Court after a jury trial. On February 9, 2012, Appellees ConocoPhillips
Company and Pioneer Pipeline Company (collectively, "Conoco") filed a
Complaint against Appellants Utah Deparhnent of Transportation ("UDOT")
and Ames Construction, Inc.(" Ames") (collectively, "UDOT"). (R. 1-8). In its
Complaint, Conoco alleged that during consh-uction of the Legacy Parkway,
UDOTcaused damage to a gas pipeline owned by Conoco. (Id.). Based upon
this allegation, Conoco asserted claims against UDOT for breach of contract and
negligence. (Id.).
In September 2015, a three-day jury trial was held in this matter. (R. 12201886). Before trial, Conoco filed a Motion i11 Limine seeking to exclude UDOT
from admitting into evidence certain opinions of its expert witness, Brent Cathey.

(R. 684-734). On September 15, 2015, the district court granted Conoco's motion
in part, concluding that UDOT had failed to lay sufficient foundation to make a
threshold showing that certain opinions were admissible under Rule 702 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence. (R. 1569:2-1572:21).
During h·ial, Conoco called several witnesses to testify. During the direct
examination of Mike Miller- one of Conoco' s fact witnesses - UDOT objected to
a statement made by Mr. Miller, arguing that it constituted inadmissible expert
3
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testimony. (R. 1644:21-1645:16). After the district court sustained UDOT's
objection, it offered to give a curative instruction to the jury. (R. 1649:7-13;
1650:23-1651:3; 1652:10-13). UDOT's h·ial counsel declined the invitation based
upon his concern that a curative insh·uction would emphasize Mr. Miller's
statement. (R. 1652:14-17). Instead, UDOT's counsel requested only that the
district court order that Mr. Miller's statement not be referenced in closing
arguments, which the district court did. (R. 1652:14-23).
At the conclusion of the three-day trial, the jury rendered a unanimous
verdict in Conoco's favor on all claims. (R. 1881-1883). The district court entered
a Final Judgment in this matter on February 1, 2016. (R. 1115-1118). On March 1,
2016, UDOT timely filed its Notice of Appeal. (R. 1140-1141).
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

A.

The Pipeline And The Project.
In late 2006, UDOT began consh·uction of the Legacy Parkway-a stretch

of highway that extends from I-215 at 2100 North Street in Salt Lake City, Utah to
1-15 and U.S. 89 in Farmington, Utah. (R. 1303:5-6). UDOT hired Ames to serve
as the general contractor for the project. (R. 1577:18-22).
Construction of the Legacy Parkway (the "Project") required the relocation
of several utilities, including a section of pipeline owned by Conoco that was
used to transport fuel from Wyoming to North Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 1303:1014). To facilitate the relocation of the pipeline, UDOT entered into two written
4
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agreements with Conoco. (R.1348:6-1354:7). Pursuant to the written
agreements, Conoco promised to relocate the section of pipeline and UDOT
agreed to reimburse Conoco for the costs of the relocation. (See id.). UDOT
further promised that it would notify Conoco before performing any work on the
Project within 25-feet of the relocated section of pipeline. (R. 1350:19-23).
Additionally, UDOT agreed that a Conoco inspector would "be required to be
onsite dming all phases of work impacting the pipeline," which included "any
time work [was] being done within 25' of the pipeline." (R. 1352:13-16).
Relocation of the pipeline was completed in March 2007. (R. 1355:2-3).
Before, during, and after installation, the relocated section of pipeline (the
"Pipeline") was inspected to ensure that it was not damaged. (R. 1356:10-16;
1426:16-25; 1637:22-1640:19). The Pipeline was comprised of steel covered by two
protective coatings and was installed at a depth of approximately 28 feet. (R.
1356:25; 1426:2-4). The majority of the Pipeline runs parallel to the Legacy
Parkway. (R. 1381:23-1384:21). However, a small section of the Pipeline crosses
under the Legacy Parkway just south of Parrish Lane in Centerville, Utah. (R.
1424:3-7).
B. The Wick Drain Installations.

Shortly after relocation of the Pipeline was completed, UDOT began
installing a series of wick drains in close proximity to the Pipeline. (R. 1581:101583:18). A wick drain is a ground improvement device that provides drainage
5
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paths for subsurface moisture to escape to the surface. (R. 1413:17-1414:2). Use
of wick drains significantly decreases the amount of time it takes for
compressible layers of soil to settle and consolidate. (R. 1415:7-1416:19). During
the Project, UDOT used hundreds of wick drains. (R. 1581:10-1583:11). These
wick drains were installed using a large excavator that drove them up to 100 feet
into the ground. (R. 1427:15-1431:10).
On April 3, 2007, Dale Baxter, one of Conoco's area supervisors, was

(fj

driving by the Project when he noticed wick drains being installed in very close
proximity to the Pipeline. (R. 1360:20-25). After stopping to investigate, Mr.
Baxter observed that 27 to 30 wick drains had been installed within seven or
eight feet of where the Pipeline's location was marked on the surface. (R.
1373:20-1374:2; 1457:22-1458:9). The closest wick drain had been installed within
just four feet of where the Pipeline had been marked. 1 (R. 1373:20-25). Based
upon his concern that the wick drains had damaged the Pipeline, Mr. Baxter
immediately shut down all work in the Pipeline's vicinity. (R. 1365:20-22).
Although UDOT's written agreements with Conoco required it to notify
Conoco, and to have a Conoco inspector present, whenever work was being
1

tJ,

Undisputed evidence presented during trial demonsh·ated that the line on the
ground marking the Pipeline's location had a margin of en-or of plus or minus
five feet on either side. (R. 1433:22-1434:4). Thus, it could reasonably be
expected that installation of a wick drain within five feet of either side of the line
would hit the Pipeline, assuming a completely level insertion and up to several
more feet on either side of the line if the insertion were not level. (R. 1437:5-9).

6
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performed within 25 feet of the Pipeline, it is undisputed that UDOT did not
provide Conoco with notice before installing the wick drains and that no Conoco
inspector was present for the installations. (R. 1363:9-12; 1365:14-19; 1587:9-16). 2
C. The DCVG Test.

After discovering that several wick drains had been installed in close
proximity to the Pipeline, Conoco hired Brent Cathey, an employee of Total
Corrosion Solutions, to perform a direct current voltage gradient ("DCVG") test
on the Pipeline. (R. 1735:14-1736:2). DCVG testing is a technique developed to
detect "holidays or voids in a pipeline's coating." (R. 1733:23-25). During his
DCVG test of the Pipeline, Mr. Cathey did not find any "holiday indications" in
the area where the wick drains were installed. (R. 1739:9-17).
D. Discovery Of Damage To The Pipeline.

On May 3, 2010, damage to the Pipeline was discovered during a routine
inspection of the Pipeline performed with a caliper tool. (R. 1378:5-11; 1629:1724). The observed damage consisted of two dents on the top of the Pipeline
approximately 21.69 feet apart. (R. 1442:6-1444:11). One dent was 0.6 inches
deep and was located at the 12:15 position on the Pipeline. (Id.). The other dent
was 1.05 inches deep and was located at the 11:00 position. (Id.). The GPS
coordinates of the damaged area indicate that the dents are located in the exact
11

During his closing argument, UDOT' s trial counsel stated: Did [Conoco]
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that [UDOT] breached the contract?
[It] did, the calls weren't made, the inspector wasn't present." (R. 1864:1-7).

2
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location where UDOT installed wick drains in very close proximity to the
Pipeline in April 2007. (R. 1378:5-11; 1382:1-1385:4; 1444:19-24).
E. The Lawsuit And The Trial.

After discovering the damage to the Pipeline, Conoco filed the instant
lawsuit. In its Complaint, Conoco asserted claims against UDOT for breach of
contract and negligence. (R. 1-8).
A three-day jury trial in this matter began on September 14, 2015. (R.
1220). During h-ial, Conoco presented substantial evidence demonstrating that
the wick drain installations caused the dents on the Pipeline. (R. 1220-1886).
Indeed, after the parties rested, the jury deliberated for only 45 minutes before
rendering a unanimous verdict in Conoco's favor on all claims. (R. 1881-1883).
Because UDOT does not challenge on appeal the sufficiency of the
'2D

evidence presented during trial, the discussion below addresses only the
evidence, testimony, and rulings made and offered during trial that are relevant
to the issues before this Court.
1. Conoco's Motion in Limine And Brent Cathey's Trial Testimony.
After conducting his DCVG test, Mr. Cathey prepared a written report
documenting his findings. (R. 1733:2-3). On July 23, 2013, UDOT's trial counsel
deposed Mr. Cathey regarding the substance of his report. (R. 718-729). During
his deposition, Mr. Cathey explained that he is a high school graduate and that

8
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he has worked in the cathodic protection3 industry since approximately 1982. (R.

1726:15-21). Mr. Cathey further explained that in April 2010, Conoco hired him
to perform a DCVG test on the Pipeline. (R. 1735:19-1736:2). Mr. Cathey
believed that the purpose of the requested DCVG test was to investigate whether
the wick drain installations had damaged the Pipeline's coatings. (R. 1745:11-20).
During his deposition, Mr. Cathey provided the following opinions: (1) he
followed standards adopted by the National Association of Corrosion Engineers
when he conducted his DCVG test, (R. 1738:4-11); (2) his DCVG test did not find
any issues with the Pipeline's coatings in the area where the wick drains were
installed, (R. 1739:8-17); (3) "improper installation" is the primary cause of
damage to a pipeline's coating, (R. 1750:16-23); (4) third-party damage to a
pipeline "is very apparent versus" damage caused by improper installation, (R.

1750:16-23); (5) third-party damage caused by "some kind of mechanical machine
[is] normally going to damage the pipe as well as the coating," (R. 1751:1-4); (6)
installation of a wick drain "would definitely damage a pipeline if it got broken
into it;" (R. 726-27); (7) at the time Mr. Cathey performed the DCVG test, he did

Cathodic protection is "an electro chemical process that prevents corrosion on ..
. pipeline[s]." (R. 1727:16-19).

3

9
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not believe that wick drains had hit the Pipeline, (R. 727); and (8) no pipeline
coating can withstand a wick drain hitting it, (R. 728).4
Although Mr. Cathey' s sixth, seventh, and eighth opinions concerned the
potential effects of a wick drain hitting a pipeline, Mr. Cathey made it
abundantly clear during his deposition that he is not familiar with wick drains or
the wick drain installation process. (See R. 718-729). For example, when asked
whether he had noticed any irregularities in the wick drain installations he
observed when he conducted the DCVG test, Mr. Cathey stated: "I'm not familiar

with that process whatsoever.'' (R. 1742:6-14 (emphasis added)). Mr. Cathey also
testified that he had never had an "experience where a pipe was sh·uck by a wick
drain installer." (R. 1750:1-4). And Mr. Cathey was not asked if he had
experienced, and did not discuss experiencing, any situations similar to a wick
drain striking a pipeline. (See R. 718-729). Additionally, Mr. Cathey confirmed
that his only experience with wick drain installations was his brief observation of
wick drains being installed when he conducted the DCVG test on the Pipeline.

(R. 1558:20-22). Moreover, Mr. Cathey testified that although DCVG testing may

4

During Mr. Cathey's deposition, Conoco' s counsel objected to the questions
that elicited Mr. Cathey's sixth, seventh, and eighth opinions on the grounds
that Mr. Cathey lacked foundation and that the questions called for speculation.
(R. 726-28). As the district court recognized, UDOT' s counsel did not make any
effort to lay further foundation or to ask non-speculative questions. (See id.; see
also R. 1188). The district court also noted that if the same objections were lodged
during trial, it would "sustain the objection[s]." (R. 1191).

10
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detect "holidays" in a pipeline's coating, a DCVG test cannot determine whether
"a pipe itself [is] damaged." (R. 1751:5-7).
Before trial, UDOT designated Mr. Cathey as a non-retained expert
witness to testify on UDOT's behalf. (R. 221-223). Because Mr. Cathey resides
out of state, and could not be compelled to appear, UDOT indicated that Mr.
Cathey's testimony would be introduced during trial using his deposition
transcript. (R. 588-592).
Based upon Mr. Cathey' s lack of familiarity with wick drains and the wick
drain installation process, Conoco filed a Motion in Limine (the "Motion")
seeking to exclude, among other things, Mr. Cathey's sixth, seventh, and eighth
opinions. (R. 684-734). In its Motion, Conoco argued that UDOT had not made a
threshold showing that Mr. Cathey's opinions satisfied the requirements of Rule
702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. (Id.). More specifically, Conoco contended
11

that UDOT had failed to demonstrate and lay foundation establishing that Mr.
Cathey is qualified as an expert to testify about the effects that would result from
a wick drain hitting the Pipeline." (R. 690). Conoco also argued that Mr. Cathey
had "offered no analysis or explanation of how he reached his purported
opinion[s]" and that his opinions were too speculative and conclusory to satisfy
Rule 702' s requirements. (R. 691 ).
Additionally, Conoco contended that several erroneous statements in Mr.
Cathey's deposition testimony demonstrated that Mr. Cathey's opinions were
11
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not based upon reliable facts or data. (R. 692). For example, Mr. Cathey testified
that no wick drains had been installed within ten feet of the Pipeline even though
the parties do not dispute that 27 to 30 wick drains were installed within seven or
eight feet of where the Pipeline's location was marked on the surface. (R. 725;

1373:20-1374:1; 1457:22-1458:9). Mr. Cathey also testified that the Pipeline was
installed "four to six feet" deep and that the wick drains were installed only "20
to 30 feet" into the ground when, in reality, the Pipeline was installed
approximately 28 feet deep and the wick drains were installed to a depth of
approximately 100 feet. (R. 728; 1356:25; 1423:7-11; 1427:15-1431:10).
In September 2015, the district court heard oral argument on Conoco' s
Motion. (R. 1167; 1490; 1551). During the hearings, the district court noted that
in State v. Shepherd, 2015 UT App 208,357 P.3d 598, this Court explained that
~

"al though experiential expert testimony does not rely on anything like a
scientific method, such testimony is admissible under Rule 702 so long as an
experiential witness explains how his experience leads to the conclusion reached,
why his experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how his experience is
reliably applied to the facts." Id. at ,1 34 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
district court then stated that it had read Mr. Cathey' s deposition transcript" four
or five times," and that it did not "see anywhere in the deposition where" Mr.
Cathey explained how his alleged experience led to the conclusions he reached in
his sixth, seventh, and eighth opinions. (R. 1570:2-1572:21).

12
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Moreover, the dish·ict court noted that during Mr. Cathey's deposition,
Conoco's counsel objected to the questions that elicited Mr. Cathey's sixth,
seventh, and eighth opinions, and that UDOT's counsel did not make any effort
to lay a proper foundation for the questions. (R. 726-28; 1188; 1191). The district
court further noted that if the same objections were lodged during trial, it would
"sustain the objection[s]." (R. 1191). The district court then stated: "[H]ad we
had this witness here, 90 percent of this stuff could be ... cleared up, but where
we have [only] a deposition, then we have the record ... that we have. That's ...
part of the problem." (R. 1567:1-7; see also R. 1570:2-5).
After finding that UDOT had failed to make a threshold showing that Mr.
Cathey was qualified to offer his sixth, seventh, and eighth opinions, the district
court ruled that those opinions could not be admitted during trial. (R. 1569:21572:21).5 The district court did, however, permit UDOT to read to the jury all
other sections of Mr. Cathey's deposition transcript, including Mr. Cathey's
testimony regarding his first five opinions. (Id.; see nlso R. 1723:18-1752:14).
2. Bradley Gilson' s Testimony.
Bradley Gilson is a licensed civil and sh·uctural engineer who owns and
manages Gilson Engineering Incorporated ("Gilson Engineering"), a consulting
engineering firm that specializes in infrash·ucture design for cities,
In response to questioning by the dish·ict court, UDOT' s trial counsel conceded
that his argument that Mr. Cathey was qualified to offer his sixth, seventh, and
eighth opinions was" a bit of a sh·etch ...." (R. 1568:4-9).

5
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municipalities, and special improvement districts. (R. 1399:6-16). Throughout
his career, Mr. Gilson has observed and been in charge of "hundreds" of pipeline
installations. (R. 1404:17-1407:5). Mr. Gilson also has been responsible for
designing and overseeing "dozens" of wick drain installation projects. (R.
1414:3-15).
In 2014, Conoco retained Mr. Gilson to serve as an expert witness in this
matter. After reviewing numerous documents and other relevant materials, Mr.
Gilson drafted a report analyzing the cause of the dents discovered on the
Pipeline. (R. 1420:14-17). In relevant part, Mr. Gilson provided the following
opinions in his report: (1) "Damage to the Pipeline was not caused prior to or
during installation of the Pipeline," and (2) "Damage to the Pipeline was caused
by directional drilling associated with installation of the wick drains." (R. 1422:618).

Consistent with his report, during trial, Mr. Gilson testified that based
upon his thorough analysis and significant experience, it was his opinion that the
damage to the Pipeline was caused by UDOT' s installation of wick drains in very
close proximity to the Pipeline. (R. 1454:13-1459:13; 1462:6-9). Mr. Gilson
explained to the jury that he reached this opinion based upon, among other
things, the nature and location of the damage on the Pipeline, the absence of any
significant subterranean work in the vicinity of the Pipeline other than the wick
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drain installations, and his vast experience with pipelines and wick drain
installation projects. (R. 1454:13-1459:13; 1482:19-25).
3. Mike Miller's Testimony.
In 2007, Mike Miller was a pipeline integrity manager for Conoco. (R.

1634:18-22). During trial, Conoco called Mr. Miller as a fact wih1ess to testify
regarding the damage that was discovered on the Pipeline. (R. 1633:20-1669:12).
During his direct examination, Mr. Miller was asked what DCVG testing is, and
UDOT' s counsel did not object to the question. (R. 1643:20-23). After explaining
what DCVG testing is, and without any further questioning, Mr. Miller stated:
"Works pretty good for your typical pipeline, which is tlu-ee to six-foot deep. It's
a crap shoot on a thirty foot pipe." (R. 1644:14-15). Once Mr. Miller finished his
statement, UDOT's counsel objected, arguing that the statement constituted
inadmissible expert testimony. (R. 1644:21-1645:16).
After excusing the jury and hearing argument from the parties, the district
court stated to UDOT's counsel: "I think you're right on this, he shouldn't be
able to testify that DCVG things stink and that they're not useful." (R. 1649:7-13).
The dish·ict court then stated:
Well, here's what I can do. If I can-if I do what you
say, I'm going to say, "Okay, Indies and gentleman, I want

you to strike from your memory tlze testimony of Mr. Miller
regarding the usefulness of the DCVG test nt 28 feet." And
so I'm just going to emphasize the issue. . . . [I]f you
want me to to - if you want me to right now say, jury forget
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·whnt lze snid nbout this, then I'm emplznsizing it. I don't
know ... if that's what you want me to do.

(R. 1650:23-1651:3; 1652:10-13 (emphases added)). UDOT's counsel responded:
"I ngree your honor, and I don't think that's appropriate, but I would ... like an

order from the Court that it is not used in closing arguments." (R. 1652:14-17
(emphases added)). The district cow-t accepted this proposed resolution and
ordered that no one could refer to Mr. Miller's statement, or to the effectiveness
of DCVG testing, during closing arguments. (R. 1652:18-23). 6
Before concluding the colloquy, the district court again confirmed that
UDOT' s counsel did not want the jury to be given a curative instruction, and the
court cautioned that if a curative insh·uction were not requested, it would simply
move on with the trial. (R. 1654:15-1656:9). Confirming the district court's
understanding, UDOT' s counsel responded, "your honor, I agree, I think that

i0

solves the problem. I appreciate it." (R. 1656:16-17 (emphasis added)).

6

Although the disrrict court ordered that no one could refer to Mr. Miller's
statement or to the effectiveness of DCVG testing during closing arguments,
UDOT' s trial counsel violated this order. During his closing argument, UDOT's
trial counsel stated: "[Mr. Cathey] did the test, he found no damage to the
coating on the pipe" and now "[t]hey've come in ... and said, well, ... that's not
reliable." (R. 1859:14-21). In its brief, UDOTrepeatedly asserts that "Mr. Miller's
unsolicited ... opinion was the only testimony or evidence at trial as to Mr.
Cathey's DCVG test being unreliable." UDOT Br. at 28. Thus, it is abundantly
clear that UDOT's trial counsel's statement related directly to Mr. Miller's
testimony and violated the district court's order.
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4. The Jury's Verdict.
At the conclusion of the three-day trial, the jury was asked to deliberate
and to render a verdict. (R. 1881-1883). After only 45 minutes of deliberation,
the jury rendered a unanimous verdict in Conoco's favor on all claims. (Jd.).7
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

This is an appeal from a final judgment entered by the Second Judicial
Dish·ict Court after a jury h·ial. On appeal, UDOT argues that the district court
abused its discretion by excluding Mr. Cathey's opinions pertaining to the wick
drain installation process and the potential effects of a wick drain hitting a
Pipeline. UDOT' s position should be rejected for at least two reasons. First, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Mr. Cathey' s opinions
because UDOT failed to make a threshold showing that Mr. Cathey had
sufficient experience or expertise to reliably offer those opinions. Second, even if
the dish·ict court erred in excluding Mr. Cathey's opinions, which it did not, any
such error was harmless and does not justify reversal of the jury's unanimous
verdict.

The written agreements that UDOT and Conoco executed state: "The
prevailing party in any litigation arising hereunder shall be entitled to its
reasonable attorney fees and court costs, including fees and costs incurred
through any applicable appeal process." (Tr. Ex. 2). Accordingly, before
entering Final Judgment, the district court entered an Order granting Conoco its
fees and costs. (R. 1089; 1111-1118).

7

17

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

UDOT also contends on appeal that the dish·ict court abused its discretion
by not giving a curative instruction in response to UDOT's objection to Mr.
Miller's testimony. This is incorrect. As an initial matter, UDOT's h"ial counsel
expressly declined the district court's invitation to issue a curative instruction.
Thus, the invited error docb.·ine precludes appellate review of UDOT's claimed
error. Additionally, during trial, UDOT waived, and failed to preserve for
fj

appeal, any arguments based upon the district court's alleged failure to issue a
curative insh·uction because UDOT never requested that such an instruction be
given. Finally, even if UDOT had preserved this issue, which it did not, the
dish·ict court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on UDOT' s objection to Mr.
Miller's testimony because the district court granted UDOT the precise and
exclusive relief that UDOTrequested.
For these reasons, the jury's verdict and the district court's Final Judgment
should be affirmed, and Conoco should be awarded the attorney fees and costs it
has incurred in connection with this appeal.
ARGUMENT

I. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING PORTIONS
OF MR. CATREY'S DEPOSITION TESTIMONY.

As explained below, the district court's decision to exclude portions of Mr.
Cathey' s deposition testimony from being read into evidence was not erroneous
and does not warrant reversal of the jury's unanimous verdict for at least two

4t)
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reasons. First, the dish·ict court did not abuse its discretion by excluding certain
of Mr. Cathey's opinions because UDOT failed to demonstrate that Mr. Cathey
had sufficient experience or expertise to reliably offer those opinions. Second,
even if the dish·ict court erred in excluding Mr. Cathey's opinions, which it did
not, any such error was harmless and does not justify reversal of the jury's
verdict.
A. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Excluding Portions
Of Mr. Cathey's Deposition Testimony.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding portions of Mr.
Cathey' s deposition testimony relating to wick drain installation and its potential
impact on pipelines because UDOT failed to demonstrate that Mr. Cathey had
sufficient experience or expertise to offer the excluded opinions. Rule 702(a) of
the Utah Rules of Evidence states: "Subject to the limitations in paragraph (b), a
witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert's
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the h·ier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Paragraph (b) of Rule
702 provides that: "Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may
serve as the basis for expert testimony only if there is a threshold showing that
the principles or methods that are underlying in the testimony (1) are reliable, (2)

19

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (3) have been reliably applied to the
facts."
Interpreting Rule 702, Utah courts have noted that not all expert testimony
needs to be based upon a "particular methodology." State v. Shepherd, 2015 UT
App 208, ,r 34. More specifically, the Utah Supreme Court has explained that
"[i]dentification of a methodology is not necessary where exposure to a nearly

identical situation. forms the basis of the expert's opinion." Eskelson ex 1·el. Eskelson

·v. Dn-vis Hosp. & Med. Cb'., 2010 UT 59, 'if 15, 242 P.3d 762 (emphasis added).
However, in addition to laying sufficient foundation to demonsh·ate that an
expert has been exposed to a nearly identical situation, "experiential expert
testimony" is admissible under Rule 702 only if the "experiential witness
explains how his experience leads to the conclusion reached, why his experience
is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how his experience is reliably applied to
the facts." Shepherd, 2015 UT App 208, at 'if 34 (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also, e.g., United States i,. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 167 (4th Cir. 2010).
Thus, as with all expert testimony, the party seeking to introduce testimony from
an experiential expert witness has the burden to demonstrate that Rule 702' s
requirements are satisfied. See, e.g., State i,. Guard, 2015 UT 96, ,I 64,371 P.3d 1;

Ross v. Epic Eng'g, PC, 2013 UT App 136, ,r,r 18-19, 307 P.3d 576.
As this Court has explained, in determining whether a party has met its
burden under Rule 702, "the trial court performs an important gatekeeping
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function, intended to ensure that only reliable expert testimony will be presented
to the jury." Gunn Hill Dairy Properties, LLC v. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power,
2012 UT App 20,131,269 P.3d 980. In performing this gatekeeping function,
district courts may properly exclude an expert who is not qualified to testify
regarding a different field or regarding a subject that exceeds the scope of the
expert's knowledge, skill, and experience. See, e.g., Ross, 2013 UT App 136, at 11
16-19 (holding that a geotechnical engineer was not qualified to testify regarding
matters that crossed into structural engineering).
This Court also has explained that trial courts have "wide discretion in
determining the admissibility of expert testimony, and such decisions are
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." Sheplterd, 2015 UT App 208, at
1 11 (emphasis added). "Under this standard, [an appellate court] will not
reverse a decision to admit or exclude expert testimony unless the decision

exceeds the limits of reaso11abilihJ. Id. (emphasis added). Moreover, even if a
11

dishict court abuses its discretion by excluding expert testimony, such error does
not warrant reversal unless it is found to be harmful. See, e.g., GodesktJ v. Provo
City Corp., 690 P.2d 541,548 (Utah 1984).
During the trial in the instant case, the district court permitted Mr. Cathey
to explain what DCVG testing is, the purpose of a DCVG test, and the details of
the DCVG test that he performed on the Pipeline. (R. 1723:18-1752:14). The
district court also allowed UDOT to admit several of Mr. Cathey's opinions into
21
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evidence, including Mr. Cathey's testimony that: (1) he followed standards
adopted by the National Association of Corrosion Engineers when he performed
the DCVG test, {R. 1738:4-11); (2) his DCVG test did not find any issues with the
Pipeline's coatings in the area where the wick drains were installed, (R. 1739:817); (3) "improper installation" is the primary cause of damage to a pipeline's
coating, (R. 1750:16-23); (4) third-party damage to a pipeline "is very apparent
Gi)

versus" damage caused by improper installation, (R. 1750:16-23); and (5) thirdparty damage caused by "some kind of mechanical machine [is] normally going
to damage the pipe as well as the coating," (R. 1751:1-4).
However, after reviewing Mr. Cathey' s deposition transcript "four or five
times" and finding that the Mr. Cathey had failed to provide any foundational
testimony demonstrating knowledge of wick drains or wick drain installations,
the disb.·ict court prohibited UDOT from introducing Mr. Cathey' s opinions that:
(1) installation of a wick drain "would definitely damage a pipeline if it got
broken into it;" (R. 726-727); (2) he did not believe that the wick drain installers
had hit the Pipeline at the time he inspected the Pipeline, (R. 727); and (3) no
pipeline coating can withstand a wick drain hitting it, (R. 728).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding these opinions
for several reasons. First, Mr. Cathey does not have sufficient scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge to offer reliable opinions regarding the
potential effects of a wick drain hitting a pipeline. Mr. Cathey's own deposition
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testimony demonstrates that he is not an expert on wick drains or the wick drain
installation process. (See R. 718-729). More specifically, during his deposition,
Mr. Cathey testified that: (1) he is "not familiar" with the wick drain installation
process "whatsoever," (R. 1742:6-12; 1752:3-4); (2) he has never had any
experience with a situation in which a pipeline was struck by a wick drain, (R.
1750:1-4); (3) the entirety of his knowledge concerning the wick drain installation
process was based upon his observation of wick drain installations when he
performed the DCVG test on the Pipeline, (R. 1751:24-1752:7; see also R. 1562:121563:5); and (4) he was not able "to determine in the course of [his] survey
whether the [Pipeline] itself was damaged," (R. 1751:5-7). Because Mr. Cathey
has no familiarity with wick drains or the wick drain installation process, he was
not qualified to offer his excluded opinions and his testimony would have been
of no assistant to the trier of fact. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by prohibiting UDOT from admitting into evidence Mr. Cathey' s
excluded opinions.
Second, even if Mr. Cathey had sufficient specialized knowledge to offer
reliable opinions regarding the effects of a wick drain hitting a pipeline, UDOT
did not lay any foundation during Mr. Cathey's deposition demonstrating that
Mr. Cathey possesses such knowledge. As previously noted, during his
deposition, Mr. Cathey repeatedly confirmed that he does not have any
knowledge of or experience with wick drains or the wick drain installation
23
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process. (See R. 718-729). And even after Conoco' s counsel objected to the
questions that elicited Mr. Cathey's excluded opinions on the grounds that Mr.
Cathey lacked foundation and that the questions called for speculation, UDOT' s
counsel did not rephrase the questions or lay any foundation. (See R. 718-729).
Instead, UDOT's counsel simply moved on to other topics. (See id.). 8 Because
UDOT did not lay sufficient foundation during Mr. Cathey's deposition to make
a threshold showing that Mr. Cathey' s opinions satisfied the requirements of
Rule 702, the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Mr. Cathey' s
opinions.
Third, during his deposition, Mr. Cathey did not provide a sufficient
explanation of how he reached his excluded opinions to make a threshold
showing that the excluded opinions are reliable. (See id.). Rather than explain
how he arrived at his opinions, Mr. Cathey provided only conclusory and
speculative testimony. (See id.). For example, although Mr. Cathey opined that
a wick drain "would definitely damage a pipeline if it got broke into it," (R. at
726-727), he offered no testimony concerning how he reached that conclusion.

(R. 718-729). Moreover, Mr. Cathey specifically stated that his DCVG test could
detect only damage to a pipeline's coating and could not detect whether a
pipeline itself had been damaged. (R. 1751:5-7). Thus, the basis for Mr. Cathey's
Importantly, UDOTcould not remedy the deficiencies in Mr. Cathey's
deposition testimony through live testimony at trial because Mr. Cathey did not
appear for trial.
8
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opinion is entirely unclear. Simply stated, Mr. Cathey's conclusory and
speculative testimony regarding the potential effects of a wick drain hitting a
pipeline was not reliable and was properly excluded. See, e.g., Thurston ·v.

Workers Comp. Fund of Utah, 2003 UT App 438, ir 20, 83 P.3d 391 ("The general
rule regarding the certainty of an expert's opinion is that the expert may not give
an opinion which represents a mere guess, speculation, or conjecture." (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion.
In its brief, UDOT advances two primary arguments in an attempt to
support its position that the district court abused its discretion by excluding Mr.
Cathey' s opinions. For the reasons explained below, both of these contentions
should be rejected and the district court's ruling should be affirmed.
1. Mr. Cathey's One-Time Observation Of Wick Drain Installations Does
Not Qualify Him As A Wick Drain Expert.
Mr. Cathey's observation of wick drains being installed when he
conducted the DCVG test on the Pipeline does not qualify him as an expert on
wick drains and the wick drain installation process. Although UDOT
acknowledges Mr. Cathey's statement that he was not familiar with the wick
drain installation "process whatsoever," UDOT argues that Mr. Cathey "had an
understanding of the wick drain installation process" based upon his observation
of wick drains being installed when he performed the DCVG test. UDOT Br. at
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22-23.9 This argument is meritless. Observing wick drain installations one time
does not qualify Mr. Cathey as an expert to opine on the potential impacts of a
wick drain hitting a pipeline. See, e.g., Ross, 2013 UT App 136, at ,r 19.
For example, in Ross, this Court held that an expert witness was not
qualified to offer his opinion "that a machine operator or contractor wouldn't
necessarily be able to determine if the soil they were digging into was native or
fill" because the expert's "personal experience in excavation was limited to two
small personal projects." Id.
Like the expert in Ross, Mr. Cathey's one-time observation of wick drain
installations does not constitute the type of foundational experience necessary to
qualify Mr. Cathey as an expert to opine on the potential effects of a collision
between a wick drain and a pipeline. See id. Moreover, Mr. Cathey did not
explain during his deposition how his one-time observation of wick drain
installations led him to reach his excluded opinions. (See R. 718-729). Thus, even

if observing wick drain being installed on a single, isolated event could provide
Mr. Cathey with sufficient experience to reliably render the excluded opinions,

Throughout its brief, UDOT repeatedly notes that Conoco, not UDOT, initially
retained Mr. Cathey. UDOT Br. at 18-19; 25. This is a red herring. Conoco's
decision to retain Mr. Cathey to perform the DCVG test several years before this
litigation was even contemplated is entirely irrelevant to the question of whether
UDOT -the party who sought to introduce Mr. Cathey' s testimony during
trial- made a sufficient threshold showing to render Mr. Cathey' s opinions
admissible under Rule 702, which it did not do.
9
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which it cannot, UDOT' s argument still fails because Mr. Cathey did not explain
how the experience led to the conclusions he reached, why his experience was a
sufficient basis for the opinions, or how his experience was reliably applied to
the facts of this case. See, e.g., Shepherd, 2015 UT App 208, at ,r 34. UDOT' s
position should, therefore, be rejected.
2. This Court's Opinion In Shepherd Does Not Support UDOT's Position.
Contrary to UDOT's suggestions, this Court's opinion in Shepherd does not
support UDOT' s position. Throughout its brief, UDOT repeatedly argues that
the Shepherd decision suggests that the district court abused its discretion by
excluding Mr. Cathey's opinions regarding the potential effects of a wick drain
hitting a pipeline. Tilis is not correct.
In Shepherd, th.is Court considered whether a district court had erred in
admitting the testimony of a boating expert in a criminal trial of a defendant who
hit and killed a woman with a boat. 2015 UT App 208, at ,r 11. During the trial,
the district court permitted the prosecution's expert to testify about "how sound
travels over water" and "about his experiences when hitting items in the water,
particularly what can be felt, heard, and seen in such situations." Id. at ,i 30.
Before offering any of this opinion testimony, the prosecution laid
foundation demonstrating that the boating expert had substantial experience in
these areas, including "time in the Coast Guard, more than ten years as a boating
officer at Lake Powell, more than ten years as the boating director for the state
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park system, and more than 20,000 hours spent on the water." Id. at 1 33. The
boating expert also had "h·aining ... on boat accident investigation, the
opportunity ... to assist scientists in conducting a test on the noise emitted by
boats, personal experience operating boats like the kind [the defendant] owned,
and his own observations when hitting objects in the water." Id. at 1 35.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the district court had erred in
permitting the expert witness to testify about what can be felt, heard, and seen
when a boat hits an item in the water. Id. at iI 39. This Court rejected the
defendant's contention. Id. In so doing, this Court first noted that "although

~

experiential expert testimony does not rely on anything like a scientific method,
such testimony is admissible under Rule 702 so long as an experiential wih1ess
explains how his experience leads to the conclusion reached, why his experience
is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how his experience is reliably applied to
the facts." Id. at 134 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court then stated:

As part of his testimony 1·egardi11g what mt individual might
feel, hear, and see when he hits an object with a boat, the
boating expert related a story from when he was in the Coast
Guard and his boat struck a harbor seal. He explained that lze
''felt it 011 the steering wheel slightly, heard it go underneath
the boat, [and saw a] red spot in the water." ... Of course
there are differences between seals and humans, but it
would be illogical to conclude that only those
individuals who have hit a human with their boat could
proper!y provide expert opinion in this case as to the
physical manifestations of sh·iking an unseen object in
the water. Instead, the boating expert used his experience of

hitting a large, living thing to draw an mzalogy to the instant
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case. Any weaknesses in that analogy could be-and
were- attacked on cross-examination and highlighted
in closing argument, but an adequate threshold
showing was nonetheless made under rule 702(b)(3).
Id.

,r 39 (emphases added).
As the district court observed during the trial in the instant case, Mr.

Cathey's experience is not even remotely comparable to the boating expert's
relevant experience in Shepherd. (R. 1562:20-1563:2; 1569:2-1572:21). As an initial
matter, during UDOT's deposition of Mr. Cathey, UDOT failed to demonstrate
that Mr. Cathey has sufficient experience to offer reliable opinions regarding
wick drains, the wick drain installation process, or the potential effects of a wick
drain hitting a pipeline. Whereas the boating expert in Shepherd had substantial
experience on the water, training in accident investigation, and an analogous
situation hitting an object in the water, Mr. Cathey readily conceded that he is
completely unfamiliar with wick drains and the process by which wick drains
are installed. (R. 1742:6-12; 1750:1-4; 1752:3-4). Indeed, Mr. Cathey's only
knowledge of the wick drain installation process was based upon his brief
observations while he performed the DCVG test on the Pipeline. (R. 1558:17-23).
Additionally, when Conoco' s counsel lodged foundation objections to
questions that elicited the excluded opinion testimony during Mr. Cathey's
deposition, UDOT' s counsel did not even attempt to lay sufficient foundation.
(See R. 718-729). Thus, unlike the prosecutor in Shepherd, UDOT's counsel did
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not have Mr. Ca they explain how his alleged experience led to the opinions he
reached, why his alleged experience was a sufficient basis for his opinions, or
how his alleged experience was applied to the facts. (See id.).
Moreover, unlike in Slzeplzerd where the expert wih1ess testified during
trial, UDOT's failure to demonstrate during Mr. Cathey's deposition that Mr.
Cathey had sufficient knowledge, skill, or experience to reliably offer the
excluded opinions could not be cured tlu·ough Mr. Cathey's trial testimony
because Mr. Cathey did not appear for h·ial. As the district court observed: "[I]f
we had Mr. Cathey present, some of these issues could have been resolved, but
the problem is all we have is what he said that is etched in paper and questions
and answers and ends there. And the problem that I'm faced with is that I've
read his deposition four or five times ... [aJnd for some reason, you know, these

things weren't brought up." (R. 1570:2-15 (emphasis added)).
Finally, unlike the expert in Shepherd who drew upon his experience
hitting a seal in the water to render opinions about a similar circumstance, Mr.
Cathey was not asked to render, and never suggested that he had rendered, an
opinion based upon a situation factually analogous to a wick drain hitting a
pipeline. (See R. 718-729). Indeed, Mr. Cathey expressly testified that he had
never experienced a circumstance in which a wick drain had hit a pipeline, and
he was not asked about, and did not reference, any experiences that were even

~
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remotely similar to the situation at issue in this case. (See id.). 10 Instead of
relying on such an experience and applying it to the facts of this case, Mr. Cathey
simply provided conclusory opinions without any indicia of reliability. Such
unsupported opinion testimony does not satisfy Rule 702' s requirements or the
standard articulated by this Court in Shepherd. See, e.g., Thurston, 2003 UT App
438, at 120.

For these reasons, UDOT's reliance on this Court's analysis in Slzeplzerd is
entirely misplaced.

#

#

#

In sum, because any testimony concerning the potential effects of a wick
drain hitting a pipeline-a process and a situation with which Mr. Cathey was
admittedly not familiar- would have exceeded the scope of Mr. Cathey's
expertise, the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Mr. Cathey' s
opinions regarding wick drains and the wick drain installation process.

i)

Although Mr. Cathey testified that he was "familiar with many cases where a
pipeline was struck by a third party and the coating was damaged," (R. 1750:7-8),
he was not asked about, and did not explain, the circumstances in which those
cases occun·ed, (See R. 718-729). Thus, UDOT's suggestion that those situations
were sufficiently analogous to the facts in the instant case to qualify Mr. Cathey
to render a reliable opinion is misplaced.
10
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B. Even If The District Court Erred In Excluding Portions Of Mr. Cathey' s
Deposition Testimony, Any Such Error Was Harmless.
Even if the district court erred in excluding from evidence portions of Mr.
Cathey's deposition testimony, which it did not, any such error was harmless
and does not warrant reversal of the jury's verdict.
It is well established that "[a]n erroneous decision to admit or exclude
evidence does not constitute reversible error unless the error is harmful." Jensen
v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 2003 UT 51,

~

100, 82 P.3d 1076 (internal quotation marks

omitted). "[A]n error is harmful only if the likelihood of a different outcome is
sufficiently high as to undermine [an appellate court's] confidence in the
verdict." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 796 (Utah 1991). Thus, "[e]ven
when the trial court has erred in its evidentiary decision, reversal is appropriate
only in those cases where, after review of all the evidence presented at h·ial, it
appears that absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood that a different
result would have been reached." Lawrence ·v. MountainStar Henltlzcnre, 2014 UT
App 40, 1 16,320 P.3d 1037 (internal quotation marks omitted); see nlso Utah R.
Civ. P. 61 ("The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error
or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the
parties."). Accordingly, "the person asserting error has the burden to show not

'IP

only that the error occurred but also that it was substantial and prejudicial."

Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, file., 1999 UT App 80, ,I 8, 977 P.2d 508.
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Here, UDOT has failed to meet this burden for at least two reasons. First,
UDOT has not demonstrated, and cannot demonsh·ate, that there is a reasonable
likelihood that the jury would have rendered a different verdict if Mr. Cathey' s
excluded opinions had been admitted during trial. Second, the dish·ict court's
exclusion of Mr. Cathey' s opinions ca1mot constitute reversible error because the
excluded opinions were merely cumulative of other evidence that was admitted
during trial.
1. It Is Not Reasonably Likely That The Jury Would Have Rendered A

Different Verdict If The Excluded Opinions Had Been Admitted During
Trial.
UDOT has failed to establish that the district court's alleged en-or in
excluding Mr. Cathey' s opinions was harmful. In its brief, UDOT does not even
attempt to demonstrate that, absent the district court's alleged error, there is a
reasonable likelihood that the jury would have reached a different result-nor
could it. During trial, the jury heard a plethora of evidence demonstrating that
UDOT damaged the Pipeline while installing wick drains. This evidence
included, but was not limited to, Mr. Baxter's testimony that the GPS coordinates
of the dents were in the exact location where he observed 27 to 30 wick drains
installed in dangerously close proximity to the Pipeline in April 2007, (R.1384:3-

1385:4), and Mr. Gilson' s testimony that " [d]amage to the Pipeline was caused by
directional drilling associated with installation of the wick drains," (R. 1422:9-11).
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i)

Moreover, during trial, UDOTwas permitted to inrroduce Mr. Cathey's
testimony that the DCVG test he administered did not find any issues with the
Pipeline's coatings in the area where the wick drains were installed. (R. 1739:817). Although UDOT's trial counsel repeatedly suggested that these results
demonstrated that UDOT had not hit the Pipeline with wick drains, the jury did
not agree. (See, e.g., R. 1324:23-1325:15; 1859:6-1860:24). Indeed, after only 45
~

minutes of deliberation, the jury unanimously found UDOT liable for damaging
the Pipeline.1 1 In reaching this conclusion, the jury necessarily rejected the
position that the DCVG test demonsh·ated that UDOT had not damaged the
Pipeline. Accordingly, because the DCVG test results were the only basis in the
record for Mr. Cathey to have reached his excluded opinions, it is not reasonably
likely that the jury would have rendered a different verdict if Mr. Cathey' s
excluded opinions had been admitted during rrial. Thus, UDOT' s position
should be rejected.

The jury likely disregarded Mr. Cathey's testimony because of errors in Mr.
Cathey' s understanding of the Pipeline and its surrounding conditions. For
example, based upon Mr. Cathey' s deposition testimony, the jury was aware
that, at the time he conducted the DCVG test, Mr. Cathey believed the Pipeline
was buried "four to six feet deep," (R. 1749:1-8), when, in reality, the Pipeline
was buried 28 feet deep. (R. 1356:25).

11
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2. The District Court's Alleged Error Was Not Harmful Because The
Excluded Opinions Were Cumulative Of Other Evidence Admitted
During Trial.
The district court's alleged en-or was not harmful because the excluded
opinions were cumulative of other evidence admitted during h·ial. It is well
established that exclusion of evidence is not harmful if the excluded evidence is
cumulative "and the substance of such evidence is ... admitted through some
other means." State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, 1 29, 994 P.2d 177; see also, e.g.,

Dalmken, Inc. of Salt Lake City v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420,422 (Utah 1986); Godeskt;,
690 P.2d at 548. This rule applies to all three of Mr. Cathey' s excluded opinions.
Mr. Cathey' s opinion that contact between a wick drain and the Pipeline
would have damaged the Pipeline was not disputed by Conoco during h·ial.
Indeed, that the wick drains hit and damaged the Pipeline was the very basis of
Conoco' s claims against UDOT. Thus, Conoco' s own expert, Mr. Gilson, testified
that the wick drains had hit and damaged _the Pipeline. (R. 1454:13-1459:13;
1462:2-9). Admission of Mr. Cathey' s opinion that a wick drain would "damage
a pipeline if it got broke into it," would, therefore, have been entirely superfluous
and its exclusion was not harmful.
The same is true of Mr. Cathey's excluded opinion that damage to the
Pipeline caused by wick drain installation would have damaged both the
Pipeline and its coatings. As UDOT's counsel expressly recognized during trial,
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Mr. Gilson testified to the "same thing." (R. 1494:7-1495:8).12 Moreover, UDOT
was permitted to introduce Mr. Cathey' s opinion that third-party damage caused
by II some kind of mechanical machine [is] normally going to damage the pipe as
well as the coating." (R. 1751:1-4). Thus, the jury was well aware that, in Mr.
Cathey's view, damage to a pipeline caused by a mechanical machine-such as
the machines used to install wick drains-would likely damage both the pipeline
and the pipeline's coating. (See id.).
Finally, although UDOT was prohibited from reading Mr. Cathey' s
statement that he did not believe that the wick drains had damaged the Pipeline,
that opinion was subsumed in Mr. Cathey' s testimony that UDOT was permitted
to inh·oduce. Mr. Cathey specifically testified that Conoco hired him to perform
a DCVG test on the Pipeline to determine if the wick drain installations had
damaged the Pipeline's coatings and that he did not find any "DCVG indications
... in the wick drain area" when he administered the test. (R. 1739:9-17; 1745:820; 1747:14-21).13 Even without hearing Mr. Cathey's opinion, the logical

In his closing argument, UDOT's trial counsel specifically stated: "[W]e also
have the direct evidence of, if the [P]ipeline had been hit, Mr. Gilson says with
that amount of force to cause that size of dent, the coating on the pipe would
have been damaged." (R. 1858:21-24).

12

During h·ial, other witnesses also confirmed that Conoco asked Mr. Cathey to
perform the DCVG test to determine if there "was coating damage to the
[P]ipeline," and that the DCVG test results indicated that there was "no damage
to the coating of the [P]ipeline" in the area where the wick drains were installed.
(R. 1392:6-1393:9; see also R. 1609:1-1610:14).

13
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conclusion to be reached from Mr. Cathey' s testimony is that he did not believe
wick drains had damaged the Pipeline's coatings at the time he performed the
DCVG test. This is particularly true because during trial, several other witnesses
testified that they did not believe or were not aware that the wick drains had
damaged the Pipeline until the dents were discovered in 2010. (See, e.g., R.
1393:3-24; 1609:1-1610:14). Thus, admission of Mr. Cathey's "belief" would have
been cumulative to other evidence that was admitted during h-ial and its
exclusion was, therefore, harmless.
In sum, because the substance of the excluded opinions was cumulative to
other evidence admitted during trial, even if erroneous, the district court's
exclusion of Mr. Cathey's opinions was not harmful and does not warrant
reversal. See, e.g., Colwell, 2000 UT 8, at ,r 29.
#

#

#

Simply stated, even if Mr. Cathey's opinions had been admitted into
evidence, it is not reasonably likely that the jury would have reached a different
result. Thus, the dish·ict court's alleged e1Tor in excluding Mr. Cathey's opinions
was, at most, harmless and does not constitute reversible error. UDOT' s
arguments concerning the exclusion of Mr. Cathey's opinions should, therefore,
be rejected and the jury's verdict should be affirmed.
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
RULING ON UDOT'S OBJECTION TO MR. MILLER'S TESTIMONY.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on and resolving
UDOT's objection to Mr. Miller's testimony. As explained below, UDOT's
arguments concerning the district court's ruling should be rejected for at least
three reasons. First, the invited error doch·ine precludes appellate review of
UDOT' s contention that the district court abused its discretion by failing to issue
a curative instruction in response to UDOT' s objection. Second, during h·ial,
UDOT waived any arguments relating to the district court's alleged failure to
issue a curative instruction because UDOT never requested that such an
instruction be given. Third, the dishict court did not, as a matter of law, abuse
its discretion in ruling on UDOT' s objection to Mr. Miller's testimony because it
granted UDOT the precise and exclusive relief that UDOT requested.
A. The Invited Error Doctrine Precludes Appellate Review Of UDOT'S
Arguments Concerning Mr. Miller's Testimony.

The invited error doctrine precludes appellate review of UDOT' s
arguments concerning Mr. Miller's testimony. It is clearly established that
"invited error precludes appellate review of an issue." State ·v. McNeil, 2013 UT
App 134, ,I 24, 302 P.3d 844. As Utah appellate courts have repeatedly
emphasized, "[t]he invited error doch·ine ensures that a party cannot take
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the h·ial court into
committing the error." Id. at ,I 19 (internal quotation marks omitted). "By
38
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precluding appellate review, the [invited error] doctrine furthers this principle
by discouraging parties from intentionally misleading the trial court so as to
preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal." Stnte ·v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4,

,r

15, 128 P.3d 1171 (internal quotation marks omitted). TI1e invited error doctrine
also "fortifies [the] long-established policy that the lTial court should have the
first opportunity to address a claim of error." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Utah Courts "have recognized a number of ways in which a [litigant] has
led a trial court into committing error." State ·o. Geulcgeuzinn, 2004 UT 16, ,110, 86
P.3d 742. For example, in Winfield the Utah Supreme Court explained that
"[a]ffirmative representations that a party has no objection to the proceedings fall
within the scope of the invited error doctrine because such representations
reassure the h·ial court and encourage it to proceed without further consideration
of the issues." 2006 UT 4, at ,r 16. Additionally, in McNeil, this Court held that a
party invites error, and does not preserve an issue for appeal, if the "party
initially objects [to an issue] but later, while the wheel's still in spin, abandons
the objection and stipulates to the court's intended action." 2013 UT App 134, at

,r 23 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Braun v. Nevada Chemicals,
Inc., 2010 UT App 188, ,r,r 13-15, 236 P.3d 176.
During the trial in McNeil, defense counsel objected to a witness's
testimony on hearsay grounds. 2013 UT App 134, at ,r 18. After the objection
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~

was lodged, the hial judge had a lengthy discussion with defense counsel
regarding the objection. Id. at ,t,t 20-21. After the trial judge "gave his take on
the situation," defense counsel "acquiesced" and "did not dispute [the trial
judge's] characterization of the [testimony]." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). On appeal, the defendant argued that the district court had erred in
admitting the testimony, but this Court refused to review the issue. ld. at ,I 23.
In so doing, this Court stated: "[T]o present an issue to the trial court in such a
way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue, a party must
communicate to the cow·t that he or she believes-not merely believed-that the
court is heading down the wrong track." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, because defense counsel "initially object[ed] but later ... abandon[ed] the
objection [by] stipulate[ing) to the court's intended action," this Court held that
"any error was invited" and that no claim of error had been preserved for
appeal. Id.
This Court also reached the same conclusion in Tsclzngge11y v. Milbank Ins.

Co., 2007 UT 37, 163 P.3d 615. In Tschaggeny, the plaintiff's counsel initially
objected to a motion in limine, which requested that certain evidence be excluded
from trial. Id. at ,I,I 12-13. However, during a hearing on the motion, the
plaintiff's counsel "essentially stipulated that [the motion] be granted" by not
objecting to the "relief ordered" by the district court. Id. at ,I 13. This Court later
refused to review the district court's ruling on the motion, concluding that "[t]o
40
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the extent the trial judge committed any legal error in granting the motion, she
was invited to do so by [the plaintiff's] own counsel" who "clearly
communicated his agreement to the relief ordered." Id.
Like in McNeil and Tschaggeny, UDOT' s claim of error concerning the
district court's ruling on UDOT' s objection to Mr. Miller's testimony was not
preserved for appeal because UDOT's trial counsel invited any alleged error.
During his direct examination, Mr. Miller was asked to explain what DCVG
testing is, and UDOT's counsel did not object to the question. After explaining
what DCVG testing is, and without any further questioning, Mr. Miller stated:
"Works pretty good for your typical pipeline, which is three to six-foot deep. It's
a crap shoot on a thirty foot pipe." (R. 1644:14-15). After Mr. Miller finished his
statement, UDOT' s counsel objected, arguing that the statement constituted
inadmissible expert testimony. (R. 1644:21-1645:16).
The district court excused the jury, and after hearing argument from the
parties, stated to UDOT' s counsel: "I think you' re right on this, he shouldn't be
able to testify that DCVG things stink and that they're not useful." (R. 1649:7-13).
The district court then explained:
Okay. Well, here's what I can do. lfl can-if I do what you

say, I'm going to say, Okay, ladies and gentleman, I want you
to strike from your memon1 the testimony of Mr. Miller
regarding the usefulness of the DCVq test at 28 feet. And
so I'm just going to emphasize the issue. . . . [IJJ you
want me to - if you want me to riglzt now say, jury forget
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what he said about this, then I'm emphasizing it. I don't
know ... if that's what you want me to do.

(R. 1650:23-1651:3; 1652:10-13 (emphases added)). In response, UDOT's counsel
immediately stated: "I agree your honor, and I don't think that's nppmprinte, but I
would ... like an order from the Court that it is not used in closing arguments."

(R. 1652:14-17). The dish·ict court accepted this proposed resolution and ordered
that no one could reference Mr. Miller's statement during closing arguments. (R.
1652:18-23).
Before concluding the colloquy, the district court again confirmed that
UDOT' s counsel did not want the jury to be given a curative insh·uction. (R.
1656:5-17). The district court also cautioned that if a curative instruction were
not requested, it would simply move on with the trial. (Id.). Confirming the
11

district court's understanding, UDOT's counsel responded, your honor, I agree,
I think that solves the problem. I appreciate it." (R. 1656:16-17).
II

On appeal, UDOT argues that the dish·ict court abused its discretion by
not striking" Mr. Miller's statement and by "not issuing a curative instruction to
the jury." (UDOT Br. at 31-32). But during h·ial, UDOT's counsel affirmatively
represented to the district court that he did not want the court to address Mr.
Miller's statement with the jury and that he did not want a curative instruction to
be given. (R. 1650:23-1651:3; 1656:17). He also "agree[d]" that the court had
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resolved the problem by moving on and simply ordering that the statement not
be referenced in closing arguments. (R. 1656:16-17).
As both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have repeatedly
explained, the invited error doctrine prohibits a party from stipulating to
particular relief during h·ial and then complaining that such relief was erroneous
on appeal. See, e.g., McNeil, 2013 UT App 134, at ,r,r 18-23. Yet, that is precisely
what UDOT attempts to do here. Having affirmatively represented to the district
court that it did not want a curative instruction to be given to the jury, or for the
district court to have any discussion with the jury concerning Mr. Miller's
statement, UDOT cannot now complain that the district court abused its
discretion by not giving a curative insh·uction. See, e.g., id.; Tschnggeny, 2007 UT
37, at ,r~r 12-13.

In sum, even if the district court's failure to issue a curative instruction
were erroneous, UDOT' s counsel invited any such error, and UDOT, therefore,
failed to preserve this issue for appeal. Accordingly, applying the invited error
doch·ine, this Court should refuse to review this issue.
B. UDOT Waived Its Argument That The District Court Abused Its
Discretion By Not Giving A Curative Instruction.

UDOT waived, and failed to preserve for appeal, its argument that the
dish·ict court abused its discretion by not issuing a curative inshuction to the
jury. "To preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be presented to the trial
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court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue.''

State v. Maama, 2015 UT App 234, ,r 20, 359 P.3d 1266 (internal quotation marks
omitted). When a party fails to preserve an issue for appeal, Utah appellate
~

courts consider the issue waived and "will not review that issue." Id. 14
It is well established that to preserve an argument that a curative
insh·uction should have been given during trial, the objecting party must
specifically request that a curative instruction be given and that "failure to do so
constitutes waiver." State ·o. Rocco, 795 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Utah 1990); see also, e.g.,

Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 214 F.3d 1235, 1250 (10th Cir. 2000) ("(Appellant's]
failure to request a limiting instruction constitutes waiver of any objection based
on the court's failure to give such an instruction."); Robinson v. Audi Nsu Auto

Union Aktiengesellscliaft, 739 F.2d 1481, 1485 (10th Cir. 1984) ("It should be noted .
. . that plaintiffs in this case did not request a limiting instruction. Thus they
waived any objection to the absence of such an insh·uction."); State ·v. Kiriluk, 1999
UT App 30, ,I 23, 975 P.2d 469; State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 633, 634-35 (Utah

.,

Ct. App. 1997); State 1,. Seel, 827 P.2d 954, 962-63 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). This
principle applies with even greater force when a h·ial court indicates that it is
willing to give a curative instruction and the objecting party declines the
14

In some circumstances, an appellate court may review an issue that was not
preserved if the party requesting review can demonstrate plain error or
exceptional circumstances. See, e.g., id. These exceptions to the preservation rule
do not apply to this matter because UDOT invited the dish·ict court to commit
the alleged error it now complains about. See, e.g., Winfield, 2006 UT 4, at ,I 14.
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invitation. See, e.g., Stnte v. Warner, 257 P.3d 467, 468 n.1 (Utah App. 2011)
("Given counsel's failure to request a curative instruction when the court invited
one, ... we conclude that Defendant waived his right to appeal the court's
decision to not give a curative insh·uction."); State v. Peguese, 2001 UT App 108
(Bench, J., concurring) ("[D]efendant waived review of the gravity of the harm
when he made the strategic decision to refuse the offered curative insb·uction.");

see also, e.g., United States v. Ynzzen, 187 F. App'x 800, 803 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding
that a party waived any right to argue on appeal regarding the trial court's
failure to give a curative insrruction "when his counsel, at trial, ... stated that [he
did not want] a curative instruction because such, in [his] view, would simply
exacerbate any problem"); Rios v. Bigler, 67 F.3d 1543, 1550 (10th Cir. 1995) ([T]he
district court offered to give a limiting instruction to the jury, but Plaintiff did not
request one. As a result, the district court did not abuse its discretion .... "
(internal citations omitted)).
Here, UDOT contends that the district court should have given the jury a
curative inshuction after it sustained UDOT' s objection to Mr. Miller's statement,
but UDOT's h·ial counsel never requested that such an instruction be given.
Instead, based upon his concern that such a curative instruction could emphasize
Mr. Miller's statement to the jury, UDOT's b·ial counsel stated that he did not

want the district court to give a curative instruction. (R. 1650:23-1651:3; 1652:1417; 1656:17). Instead, UDOT's counsel requested only that the district court order
45
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that Mr. Miller's statement not be referenced in closing arguments, which the
district court did. (Id.). UDOT's counsel also confirmed that this approach
"solve[d] the problem," that he wanted the court to move on with the trial, and
that he did not want any further relief. (R. 1656:5-17). Because UDOT did not
ask the district court to give the jury a curative instruction, UDOTwaived any
arguments relating to this issue. Its position should, therefore, be rejected.15
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Ruling on UDOT'S
Objection To Mr. Miller's Testimony Because It Granted UDOT The
Precise Relief That UDOT Requested.

The district Court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on UDOT's
objection to Mr. Miller's testimony because the district court granted UDOT the
exclusive and precise relief that UDOT requested. Appellate courts have
consistently explained that a district court does not abuse its discretion when it
grants an objecting party the precise relief that the objecting party requests. See,

e.g., Manma, 2015 UT App 234, at 1 27 ("Because [the appellant] received the
relief he requested ... we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion."); see also, e.g., State ·v. Bumside, 146 N.W.2d 754,755 (Neb. 1966) ("We
point out further that the defendant was granted the relief that he asked for in
the dish·ict court. Under these circumstances, there was clearly no abuse of
discretion by the district court ...."); Sengupta v. Univ. of Alaska, 21 P.3d 1240,
15

UDOT also waived its argument regarding Mr. Miller's testimony by violating
the dish·ict court's order that no one could refer to Mr. Miller's statement during
dosing argument, which UDOT's counsel did do. (See R. 1859:14-21).
46
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1248 (Alaska 2001) (Because the superior court granted the precise relief that [the
appellant] requested, it did not abuse its discretion ... ").
Here, UDOT received the exact and sole relief that its trial counsel
requested after objecting to Mr. Miller's statement. As previously explained,
UDOT' s trial counsel asked that a curative instruction not be given to the jury
and that the court order only that Mr. Miller's statement not be referenced in
closing arguments. (R. 1650:23-1651:3; 1657:17). Because the district court
granted this requested relief, the district court could not have abused its
discretion in ruling on UDOT's objection to Mr. Miller's testimony. Accordingly,
UDOT' s argument is meritless.
#

#

#

In sum, the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in ruling on
UDOT's objection to Mr. Miller's testimony because it granted UDOT the precise
and exclusive relief that UDOT requested. Additionally, this Court should refuse
to consider the merits of UDOT' s arguments conceming the district court's ruling
because UDOT invited the alleged error of which it complains and waived its
arguments by failing to request a curative insh·uction. For these reasons,
UDOT' s position should be rejected and the jury's verdict should be upheld.
CONCLUSION

Because the dish·ict court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Mr.
Cathey' s opinions or by failing to give an unrequested curative instruction after
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sustaining UDOT's objection to Mr. Miller's testimony, UDOT's arguments
should be rejected and the jury's unanimous verdict should be upheld.
Additionally, after an appropriate motion is filed, this Court should award
Conoco all of the attorney fees and costs it has incurred in connection with this
appeal.
DATED this 15th day of August 2016.

Robert E.
Steven J. Joff

Attorneys for Pl
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West's Utah Code Annotated
State Court Rules
Utah Rules of Evidence (Refs & Annas)
Article VII. Opinions and Expert Testimony
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 702
RULE 702. TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS
Currentness

~

(a) Subject to the limitations in paragraph (b), a witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert's scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.

(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis for expert testimony only if there is a
threshold showing that the principles or methods that are underlying in the testimony

(1) are reliable,

(2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and

(3) have been reliably applied to the facts.

(c) The threshold showing required by paragraph (b) is satisfied if the underlying principles or methods, including the
sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of their application to the facts of the case, are generally accepted by the
relevant expert community.

Credits
[Amended effective November 1, 2007; December I, 2011.]

Editors' Notes
2011 ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
The language of this rule has been amended as part of the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily
understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic
only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility.

(I

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE.
Apart from its introductory clause, part (a) of the amended Rule recites verbatim Federal Rule 702 as it appeared
before it was amended in 2000 to respond to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The
2007 amendment to the Rule added that introductory clause, along with parts (b) and (c). Unlike its predecessor, the

II I
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,
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amended rule does not incorporate the text of the Federal Rule. Although Utah law foreshadowed in many respects
the developments in federal law that commenced with Daubert, the 2007 amendment preserves and clarifies differences
between the Utah and federal approaches to expert testimony.
•

{i)

(if)

i)

The amended rule embodies several general considerations. First, the rule is intended to be applied to all expert testimony.
In this respect, the rule follows federal law as announced in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). Next,
like its federal counterpart, Utah's rule assigns to trial judges a "gatekeeper" responsibility to screen out unreliable expert
testimony. In performing their gatekeeper function, trial judges should confront proposed expert testimony with rational
skepticism. This degree of scrutiny is not so rigorous as to be satisfied only by scientific or other specialized principles
or methods that are free of controversy or that meet any fixed set of criteria fashioned to test reliability. The rational
skeptic is receptive to any plausible evidence that may bear on reliability. She is mindful that several principles, methods
or techniques may be suitably reliable to merit admission into evidence for consideration by the trier of fact. The fields
of knowledge which may be drawn upon are not limited merely to the "scientific" and "technical", but extend to all
"specialized" knowledge. Similarly, the expert is viewed, not in a narrow sense, but as a person qualified by "knowledge,
skill, experience, training or education". Finally, the gatekeeping trial judge must take care to direct her skepticism to
the particular proposition that the expert testimony is offered to support. The Daubert court characterized this task as
focusing on the "work at hand". The practitioner should equally take care that the proffered expert testimony reliably
addresses the "work at hand", and that the foundation of reliability presented for it reflects that consideration.
Section (c) retains limited features of the traditional Frye test for expert testimony. Generally accepted principles and
methods may be admitted based on judicial notice. The nature of the "work at hand" is especially important here. It
might be important in some cases for an expert to educate the factfinder about general principles, without attempting
to apply these principles to the specific facts of the case. The rule recognizes that an expert on the stand may give a
dissertation or exposition of principles relevant to the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to the facts. Proposed
expert testimony that seeks to set out relevant principles, methods or techniques without offering an opinion about how
they should be applied to a particular array of facts will be, in most instances, more eligible for admission under section (c)
than case specific opinion testimony. There are, however, scientific or specialized methods or techniques applied at a level
of considerable operational detail that have acquired sufficient general acceptance to merit admission under section (c).
The concept of general acceptance as used in section (c) is intended to replace the novel vs. non-novel dichotomy that
has served as a central analytical tool in Utah's Rule 702 jurisprudence. The failure to show general acceptance meriting
admission under section (c) does not mean the evidence is inadmissible, only that the threshold showing for reliability
under section (b) must be shown by other means.

iD

Section (b) adopts the three general categories of inquiry for expert testimony contained in the federal rule. Unlike the
federal rule, however, the Utah rule notes that the proponent of the testimony is required to make only a "threshold"
showing. That "threshold" requires only a basic foundational showing of indicia of reliability for the testimony to
be admissible, not that the opinion is indisputably correct. When a trial court, applying this amendment, rules that
an expert's testimony is reliable, this does not necessarily mean that contradictory expert testimony is unreliable. The
amendment is broad enough to permit testimony that is the product of competing principles or methods in the same
field of expertise. Contrary and inconsistent opinions may simultaneously meet the threshold; it is for the factfinder to
reconcile--or choose between--the different opinions. As such, this amendment is not intended to provide an excuse for
an automatic challenge to the testimony of every expert, and it is not contemplated that evidentiary hearings will be
routinely required in order for the trial judge to fulfill his role as a rationally skeptical gatekeeper. In the typical case,
admissibility under the rule may be determined based on affidavits, expert reports prepared pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P.
26, deposition testimony and memoranda of counsel.
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~

West's Utah Code Annotated
State Court Rules
Utah Rules of Evidence (Refs & Annos)
Article I. General Provisions
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 103
RULE 103. RULINGS ON EVIDENCE
Currentness

(a) Preserving a Claim of Error. A party may claim error in a ruling to admit or exclude evidence only if the error affects
a substantial right of the party and:

(1) if the ruling admits evidence, a party, on the record:

(A) timely objects or moves to strike; and

(B) states the specific ground, unless it was apparent from the context; or

(2) if the ruling excludes evidence, a party informs the court of its substance by an offer of proof, unless the substance
was apparent from the context.

~

(i)

(b) Not Needing to Renew an Objection or Offer of Proof. Once the court rules definitively on the record--either before
or at trial--a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal.

(c) Court's Statement About the Ruling; Directing an Offer of Proof. The court may make any statement about the
character or form of the evidence, the objection made, and the ruling. The court may direct that an offer of proof be
made in question-and-answer form.

(d) Preventing the Jury from Hearing Inadmissible Evidence. To the extent practicable, the court must conduct a jury trial
so that inadmissible evidence is not suggested to the jury by any means.

(e) Taking Notice of Plain Error. A court may take notice of a plain error affecting a substantial right, even if the claim
of error was not properly preserved.

Credits
[Amended effective November 1, 2001; December I, 201 I.]

II I

• •. •

I II I

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

Editors' Notes
2011 ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
The language of this rule has been amended as part of the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily
understood and to make style and te1minology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic
only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim.

~

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. The 2001 amendment adopts changes made in Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a)
effective December I, 2000.

Notes of Decisions (759)
Rules of Evid., Rule 103, UT R REV Rule 103
Current with amendments received through May 1, 2016.
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West's Utah Code Annotated
State Court Rules
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs &Annas)
Part VII. Judgment
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 61
RULE 61. HARMLESS ERROR
Currentness
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything
done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment
or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every
stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights
of the parties.

Notes of Decisions (105)
~

Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 61, UT R RCP Rule 61
Current with amendments received through May 1, 2016.
End of Document
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